Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) can cause healthcare-associated infections with high mortality rates. New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase-1 (NDM-1) is amongst the most recently discovered carbapenemases.
Structured Summary Background
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) can cause healthcare-associated infections with high mortality rates. New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase-1 (NDM-1) is amongst the most recently discovered carbapenemases.
Aim
To report the first outbreak of NDM-1 CPE in Ireland, including microbiological and epidemiological characteristics, and assessing the impact of infection prevention and control measures.
Methods
Retrospective microbiological and epidemiological review. Cases were defined as patients with a CPE positive culture. Contacts were designated as roommates or ward mates.
Findings
This outbreak involved ten patients, with a median age of 71 years (range 45-90 years), located in three separate but affiliated healthcare facilities. One patient was infected (the index case); the nine others were colonised. Nine NDM-1-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae, a NDM-1-producing Escherichia coli and a K. pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC)-producing Enterobacter cloacae were detected between week 24 2014 and week 37 2014. Pulsed field gel electrophoresis demonstrated similarity. NDM-1 positive isolates were meropenem resistant with MICs ranging from 12 to 32 µg/ml. All were tigecycline susceptible (MICs ≤1 µg/ml). One isolate was colistin resistant (MIC 4.0 µg/ml; mcr-1 gene not detected). In 2015, four further NDM-1 isolates were detected.
Conclusions Introduction
Enterobacteriaceae are Gram-negative colonisers of the human gut. Carbapenemaseproducing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) are resistant to most classes of antimicrobials 1 . New
Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase-1 (NDM-1) is amongst the most recently discovered carbapenemase enzymes. The responsible bla NDM-1 gene is thought to have originated in the environment from plant pathogens and is plasmid-borne 2 . NDM-1 confers broad spectrum beta-lactam resistance mediated by hydrolysis of all β-lactam antimicrobials, with the exception of monobactams, such as aztreonam 3 . Many NDM-1-producing bacteria remain susceptible only to colistin, fosfomycin and tigecycline 4, 5 . Since first reported as implicated in human disease 6 , NDM-1-producing bacteria have been recovered from numerous infection sites including device-associated infections, intra-abdominal, urinary tract, bloodstream and surgical wounds 7 . Publications have described most variants of the enzyme as having originated in Asia 8 .
Acquisition of NDM-1-producers has been reported as associated with travel to known reservoirs areas, notably the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka) and the Balkan countries [9] [10] [11] , where prevalence of community carriage is estimated to be 5-15% 12 . Global dissemination is facilitated by intercontinental travel 13 , including healthcare tourism 14 , and migration 15 . International spread has been rapid 16 . The NDM isolates identified in Ireland prior to this outbreak were isolated or paired cases from a number of hospitals countrywide and generally with an identifiable link with travel. Dissemination of the bla NDM-1 gene, like other similar resistance mediators, is facilitated by inadequate infection prevention and control practice in healthcare settings 17 , uncontrolled or poorly controlled antimicrobial use 5 13 . The largest reported NDM outbreak to date in a non-endemic country was reported from Poland in 2015, where 374 cases of infection or colonisation, with a variety of NDMproducing Enterobactericeae, were identified from 40 hospitals over a two-year period 20 .
In this report, we describe what we believe to be the first outbreak of NDM-1-producing Enterobacteriaceae in Ireland, which occurred in 2014.
Methods

Setting
The Department of Clinical Microbiology at University Hospital Limerick (UHL) provides a centralised microbiology service for six acute hospital sites (800 beds; population circa 380,000 people). As an aid to contextualising this outbreak, it is notable that 48 K.
pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) and one imipenem-hydrolyzing beta-lactamase (IMI)-producing isolates were detected at UHL between February 2009 and May 2015, as previously published 21 .
Study definitions
Cases were defined as patients with a NDM-1 positive culture from any site during their hospitalisation. Contacts were designated as roommates or ward mates.
Microbiological and molecular detection of NDM-1
Since 2011, CPE surveillance at UHL had been performed on stool samples or rectal swabs using KPC-producer selective chromogenic agar (CHROMagar™ KPC, Paris, France).
MALDI-TOF MS (Bruker Diagnostics) identification was performed on all colonies, as previously described 22 . Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed using broth microdilution (ARIS Sensititre ® system-Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc, Masachusettts, USA). 
Infection control interventions
The isolation of a NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae triggered initiation of the hospital's outbreak management protocol. Rectal swabs or stool samples were obtained from all contacts of the index case. Information leaflets were distributed to all patients and family as appropriate. The Public Health England CPE toolkit was implemented during the outbreak 23 .
All infected or colonised patients were barrier nursed utilising long-sleeved disposable gowns and gloves, and single rooms were used when available. Chlorhexidine gluconate washcloths were employed for bathing of patients. Dedicated equipment was prioritised for NDMpositive inpatients, both infected and colonised, but was not available for all NDM-contacts.
A semi-automated electronic data surveillance system, ICNet™ (Baxter), was used to collate the records of the outbreak meetings and patients involved 24 . All patients identified as CPE positive or as CPE contact were flagged on the ICNet™ system and their medical charts were assigned a CPE alert sticker, placed on the front cover.
During the thirteen weeks over which this outbreak occurred, there were an additional 13
KPCs and one oxacillin-hydrolyzing carbapenamase (OXA-48) identified. This was the first OXA isolated at UHL. At a practical level, staff were familiar with the term 'KPC', but the introduction of the term 'NDM' and 'OXA' created confusion and the concept of three different types of CPE circulating simultaneously generated alarm amongst clinical staff.
Members of the infection prevention and control team provided additional education sessions at ward level to nursing staff and healthcare assistants. New CPE posters were designed explaining the different CPE types in simple and clear language, and these were placed in the doctors' residence (communal living space) and on all wards. Anecdotal feedback received regarding the posters was positive. An electronic link to the location of the CPE guideline on the hospital intranet was disseminated on a memo to all staff.
Hand hygiene audits were performed with greater frequency in affected areas, which involved twice weekly observational audits at ward level. Enhanced cleaning, twice daily, of all implicated clinical areas and patient equipment was instigated in parallel with increased auditing of cleaning practice. The index cases' room in the ICU and all ward areas, where positive NDM-1 patients had been admitted, underwent routine cleaning followed by hydrogen peroxide vapour decontamination post-discharge. A deep clean of the emergency department (ED) including the waiting room and resuscitation areas was performed as seven patients involved in the outbreak had been admitted via the ED. High-touch surfaces such as door handles, bedside lockers and chairs and bed rails were emphasised by the hospital hygiene nurse manager for cleaning to reduce cross-transmission. An ultraviolet torch was used to assess the quality of cleaning performed and face-to-face feedback regarding cleaning deficits was provided to cleaning operatives. Environmental sampling was not performed during this outbreak.
A further initiative was introduced involving, on a daily basis, a joint pharmacist/clinical microbiologist handover of all in-house carbapenem prescriptions, and subsequent discussion by the either the microbiology consultant or registrar with clinical teams regarding alternative agents where appropriate.
Results
Index Case
The index case was a community-dwelling Irish female. In the summer of 2014, she was admitted with sepsis. Blood and peritoneal fluid cultures confirmed Escherichia coli. Initial admission was to a six-bed bay in a general medical ward preceding transfer the following day to a single room in the intensive care unit (ICU). Admission screens confirmed prior colonisation with meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and vancomycinresistant Enterococcus faecium (VRE). A rectal screen at that time did not detect CPE.
Empiric therapy utilised intravenous (IV) ceftazidime 2g every 8 hours and gentamicin. As she did not respond to initial therapy, treatment was changed to meropenem 1g IV every 8
hours, metronidazole 500mg IV TDS and vancomycin 1.5g IV every 12 hours but was deescalated to meropenem monotherapy.
Seven days post admission, a rectal CPE screen (routine for ICU patients) detected a CTX-M extended spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing K. pneumoniae and NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae. A skin rash developed and diagnostic biopsies were performed on the left
forearm. An abscess developed at the skin biopsy site and a CTX-M ESBL-producing K.
pneumoniae and NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae were isolated from the abscess discharge.
IV tigecycline 50mg every 12 hours was initiated and the site was debrided surgically. The patient died 2 months following admission secondary to refractory soft tissue sepsis.
Microbiological
Prior to this outbreak, a case of NDM-producing Enterobacteriaceae had not been identified in our laboratory. None of the patients in this outbreak were known to have prior colonisation with extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) producers based on previous screening.
Three patients had been screened for CPE before this outbreak but CPE was not detected on those occasions.
In summary, nine NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae, a NDM-1-producing Escherichia coli and a KPC-producing Enterobacter cloacae were detected. Of note, the NDM-1-producing
Escherichia coli and a KPC-producing Enterobacter cloacae were identified in one patient.
The isolates were detected in samples from UHL and two affiliated regional hospitals, located 10km and 40km away, respectively.
Clinical specimens that were positive for NDM-1-producing isolates included mid-stream urine samples (n=2), rectal swabs (n=8) and skin biopsy samples (n=3) from the index case.
NDM-1-producing isolates were meropenem-resistant with MICs ranging from 12 to 32 µg/ml. All isolates were tigecycline susceptible (MICs ≤1 µg/ml). One isolate was colistinresistant (MIC 4.0 µg/ml; mcr-1 gene negative). PFGE demonstrated that the isolates were closely related (Figure 1 ). Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) was not performed.
The Outbreak: Patient demographics & epidemiological factors
The patient demographics are summarised in Table 1 Two additional NDM-1-producer positive patients were identified during the outbreak period but their CPE positivity was not explained by any apparent epidemiologic link with other outbreak related cases. These were not contacts of the index case and had no contact with UHL during the defined outbreak period, including the outpatients and the emergency departments. Patient C was identified as CPE positive from a screening rectal swab that was performed at a regional hospital 10km from UHL. This CPE screen was performed as per screening protocol because the patient had been admitted to UHL in the prior 12 months. His last admission to UHL was almost five months before the outbreak was declared. Patient J, identified as being CPE positive following a MSU sample sent for routine culture and sensitivity as the patient had symptoms of cystitis, was located in a regional hospital 40km away from UHL. Notably, this latter isolate was determined by PFGE (Figure 1 ) to be the isolate most distantly related to the other outbreak isolates.
Given the identification of NDM-1 at three different associated hospitals, a decision was made to perform contact tracing and screening of all contacts at each site. As a result of that exercise, during the outbreak, 2204 CPE screens, including contact tracing and routine CPE screening, were processed in our laboratory, which in addition to detecting the NDM-1
isolates, also identified 13 new KPCs and one OXA-48.
Carbapenem consumption
Only the index case had been prescribed meropenem during the current admission. This was prior to the isolation of a NDM-positive culture and, in total, the patient was administered five days of meropenem.
NDM-1 isolates identified in 2015
In week 31 2015, a NDM-1 producing K. pneumoniae was identified in an MSU sample from an 81-year-old female residing in a private LTCF. This patient was a contact of the index case during the outbreak but CPE was not detected at the time. PFGE demonstrated similarity to the 2014 isolates. In week 32 2015, a NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae was identified from a rectal swab of a 71-year old public LTCF patient who was known to be previously colonised with a KPC-producing Citrobacter freundii. This isolate did not demonstrate similarity to previous isolates. In week 42 2015, a NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae was isolated by rectal swab from an admission CPE screen of a patient repatriated from Bosnia.
She had not been admitted to UHL previously and had never had any specimens processed in the UHL microbiology laboratory. This isolate did not demonstrate PFGE similarity. In week 48 2015, a NDM-1-producing E. coli was detected in a 60-year patient who had been recently hospitalised in India. Again this isolate did not demonstrate similarity.
Discussion
The source of the index case patient's NDM-1-producer acquisition remains uncertain although acquisition during the hospital admission of June 2014 is considered likely. The index case had been on haemodialysis for 16 years and switched to peritoneal dialysis in 2013 (five months prior to NDM-1 detection). In our care, all haemodialysis patients undergo surveillance CPE screening every three months, but the same screening is not conducted for peritoneal dialysis patients. The index case patient was screened for rectal CPE in December 2013, at which time CPE was not detected. Following her transition to peritoneal dialysis, no further CPE screening was performed prior to her transfer to ICU on this final admission to UHL, at which time CPE was likewise undetected. She had never worked in a healthcare setting nor lived with any healthcare workers. She had no known travel to NDM-1 endemic areas.
In this outbreak, international travel was not a recognised factor, implying that there may be a hospital and/or community burden of bla NDM-1 than had not been previously appreciated.
Struelens et al. 25 NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae and NDM-1-producing E. coli were identified from one hospital (UHL) and NDM-1 producing K. pneumoniae found in the two other affiliated hospitals. The dominant species in our NDM-1 outbreak was K. pneumoniae ( Figure 1) . A successfully controlled outbreak in Mexico City reported the isolation of NDM-1 producing E. coli and NDM-1 producing E. cloacae from the same patient in addition to three NDM-1 producing K. pneumoniae isolates derived from three other epidemiologically-related patients. In that outbreak, one plasmid (IncFII) was borne by all of the isolates 27 . In a large outbreak reported from South Africa (as in our case, also from three acute hospitals), which persisted for 16 weeks in 2012, K. pneumoniae was also the dominant species and accounted for 28/38 isolates (74%) with E. cloacae accounting for the 5/38 (13%) 28 .
Learning from the outbreak
In 2013, Lin et al. 29 reported substantial community reservoirs of CPE in the United States.
Currently, there are no data available in Ireland regarding national prevalence of CPE in long-term care facilities (LTCF) as a national point prevalence study of LTCF relating to multidrug-resistant organisms has never been performed. However, three of the ten patients in this outbreak were permanent residents of three separate LTCF (two public, one private) and one other patient was a permanent resident in a residential care facility for adults with learning disabilities (Table 1) . Such a study is needed, justified by our data and the fact that, between 2009 and 2015, 140 CPE isolates were identified from clinical specimens of which 12 CPE isolates originated in local public (n=10 isolates) and two private LTCF (n=2 isolates) 30 .
Influenced by this outbreak, our antimicrobial stewardship has been modified. Overall hospital antibiotic consumption rate in defined daily doses (DDD) per 100 bed days used demonstrates the difficulty of definitely eradicating these organisms once established in the "revolving door" systems of nursing homes and hospitals. 
